Privacy Analysis of Online and Offline Systems by Chen, Tao
PRIVACY ANALYSIS OF ONLINE AND OFFLINE SYSTEMS
By
TAO CHEN
Bachelor of Science in Communication Engineering
China Jiliang University
Hangzhou, Zhejiang
China
2011
Submitted to the Faculty of the
Graduate College of the
Oklahoma State University
in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for
the Degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
JULY, 2019
PRIVACY ANALYSIS OF ONLINE AND OFFLINE SYSTEMS
Dissertation Approved:
Dr. Eric Chan-Tin
Dissertation Advisor
Dr. Nohpill Park
Dr. Christopher Crick
Dr. Weihua Sheng
ii
Name: TAO CHEN
Date of Degree: JULY, 2019
Title of Study: PRIVACY ANALYSIS OF ONLINE AND OFFLINE SYSTEMS
Major Field: COMPUTER SCIENCE
Abstract: How to protect people’s privacy when our life are banded together with
smart devices online and offline? For offline systems like smartphones, we often have
a passcode to prevent others accessing to our personal data. Shoulder-surfing attacks
to predict the passcode by humans are shown to not be accurate. We thus propose
an automated algorithm to accurately predict the passcode entered by a victim on
her smartphone by recording the video. Our proposed algorithm is able to predict
over 92% of numbers entered in fewer than 75 seconds with training performed once.
For online systems like surfing on Internet, anonymous communications networks like
Tor can help encrypting the traffic data to reduce the possibility of losing our privacy.
Each Tor client telescopically builds a circuit by choosing three Tor relays and then
uses that circuit to connect to a server. The Tor relay selection algorithm makes
sure that no two relays with the same /16 IP address or Autonomous System (AS)
are chosen. Our objective is to determine the popularity of Tor relays when building
circuits. With over 44 vantage points and over 145,000 circuits built, we found that
some Tor relays are chosen more often than others. Although a completely balanced
selection algorithm is not possible, analysis of our dataset shows that some Tor relays
are over 3 times more likely to be chosen than others. An adversary could potentially
eavesdrop or correlate more Tor traffic.
Further more, the effectiveness of website fingerprinting (WF) has been shown to have
an accuracy of over 90% when using Tor as the anonymity network. The common
assumption in previous work is that a victim is visiting one website at a time and
has access to the complete network trace of that website. Our main concern about
website fingerprinting is its practicality. Victims could visit another website in the
middle of visiting one website (overlapping visits). Or an adversary may only get
an incomplete network traffic trace. When two website visits are overlapping, the
website fingerprinting accuracy falls dramatically. Using our proposed “sectioning”
algorithm, the accuracy for predicting the website in overlapping visits improves from
22.80% to 70%. When part of the network trace is missing (either the beginning or
the end), the accuracy when using our sectioning algorithm increases from 20% to
over 60%.
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CHAPTER I
Introduction
With wide spread use of smart devices and internet, there are tons of ways to get
information or private data related to a person. When you are offline, applications
on devices like smartphones store and collect your data when you are using them.
When it comes to online, anyone between you and the website your tries to connect
may access to your data. Thus, privacy leaking is becoming a challenge to almost
everyone. People do not want to expose their identity, information or interests to
others.
1.1 Privacy of Offline Systems: Smartphone Passcode Prediction
To protect their sensitive information on devices like smartphones, people generally
lock their phones to prevent unauthorized access to their phones. The authentication
methods for smartphones range from a four-digit number, a password, to a pattern
(for Android devices only). Fingerprint, face, and voice recognition are also available
but an alternative authentication such as a passcode is also required. For those
people who choose to lock their smartphones, a four-digit PIN or patterns are most
commonly used. Are they safe now? Let’s consider a common situation. A user
needs to access her smartphone in a public setting, such as on a subway or in the
park. There are several other users around her that are watching her. This leaves an
opportunity for them to shoulder-surf the user entering her passcode and attempt to
guess what the passcode entered is. These users can then steal the smartphone and
can thus have complete access to all the victim’s files and pictures. Further, there are
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lots of cameras like CCTV in a building or on the streets. These cameras are always
recording and can record users’ entering their passcode on their smartphone.
Therefore our research goal on offline is the design and implementation of an online
algorithm to accurately predict a smartphone’s four-digit passcode using a camera to
record the victim entering the passcode [1]. With the correct passcode, we can access
to victim’s personal data. Hence, users should be more careful or use other methods
like random keypads to protect their process of entering passcode.
1.2 Privacy of Online Systems: Tor
For privacy protection in the Internet , anonymous networks, like tor, is one way to
protect against a common form of Internet surveillance known as ”traffic analysis.” [2]
Traffic analysis can be used to infer who is talking to whom over a public network.
Knowing the source and destination of your Internet traffic allows others to track
your behavior and interests. This can impact your checkbook if, for example, an
e-commerce site uses price discrimination based on your country or institution of
origin. It can even threaten your job and physical safety by revealing who and where
you are. For example, if you’re travelling abroad and you connect to your employer’s
computers to check or send mail, you can inadvertently reveal your national origin
and professional affiliation to anyone observing the network, even if the connection is
encrypted.
1.2.1 Measuring Tor Relay Popularity
The Tor network is run by volunteer relays (over 6,000). Each Tor client telescopically
builds a circuit by choosing three Tor relays and then uses that circuit to connect to
a server. The Tor relay selection algorithm makes sure that no two relays with the
same /16 IP address or Autonomous System (AS) are chosen. We measure Tor at
large scale to explore the weak aspects of anonymous system and propose methods
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to mitigate website fingerprinting attacks. By measuring Tor, we mean to collect
information about the route of a visiting to a website, such as source/destination
IPs, tor entry node record, middle node record, exit node record. Our objective is
to determine the popularity of Tor relays when building circuits [3]. We explore if
there are some relay nodes whichhave a higher chance to be selected in a circuit than
other relays.Namely, these relays are more popular. We also look into the /8,/16,
/24 subnets of all relay nodes to find out the popular subnets.We then look at the
relationship between the bandwidth of relaynodes and the popularity of relay nodes.
1.2.2 Anonymous Networks Website Fingerprinting
Most privacy-conscious users utilize HTTPS and an anonymity network such as Tor
to mask source and destination IP addresses. It has been shown that encrypted and
anonymized network traffic traces can still leak information through a type of attack
called a website fingerprinting (WF) attack. The adversary records the network traffic
and is only able to observe the number of incoming and outgoing messages, the size of
each message, and the time difference between messages. The effectiveness of website
fingerprinting has been shown to have an accuracy of over 90% when using Tor as
the anonymity network. The common assumption in previous work is that a victim
is visiting one website at a time and has access to the complete network trace of that
website. Our main concern about website fingerprinting is its practicality. Victims
could visit another website in the middle of visiting one website (overlapping visits).
Or an adversary may only get a incomplete network traffic trace. When two website
visits are overlapping or part of the network trace is missing (either the beginning or
the end), the website fingerprinting accuracy falls dramatically.
Our research focuses on analyzing more realistic traffic data to launch website
fingerprinting (WF) attacks [4]. We set up an automatic environment to collect Tor
traffic data. The traffic data includes the traffic data with a WF defense tool enabled,
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data of visiting two websites with a time overlap and so on. After that, we will apply
our proposed algorithm “sectioning” and other machine learning algorithms to find
patterns to predict websites.
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter II presents our anal-
ysis of predicting smartphone passcode. Chapter III shows the measurement of Tor
relay popularity. In Chapter IV, we review website fingerprint attacks with more re-
alistic data and our new algorithm. Finally, Chapter V concludes and provides some
avenue for future work.
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CHAPTER II
Smartphone Passcode Prediction
2.1 Introduction
As smartphones came to prominence several years ago, it has spread to many aspects
of people’s daily life. Instead of storing data in devices like laptops or desktops, people
now store most of their data, such as pictures, documents, music, personal diaries,
financial statements, contacts, etc... on their smartphones. Even if the documents are
stored in the cloud, such as on Google Drive and Apple iCloud, access to these services
are easily obtained without having to re-authenticate once access to the smartphone
is obtained. For this reason, some people decide to lock their smartphones. The
authentication methods for smartphones range from a four-digit number, a password,
to a pattern (for Android devices only). Fingerprint, face, and voice recognition are
also available but an alternative authentication such as a passcode is also required.
For those people who choose to lock their smartphones, a four-digit PIN or patterns
are most commonly used.
We focus on four-digit passcodes as they are available on all smartphones and not
just Android devices like for the pattern passcode.
Let’s consider a common situation. A user needs to access her smartphone in a
public setting, such as on a subway or in the park. There are several other users
around her that are watching her. This leaves an opportunity for them to shoulder-
surf the user entering her passcode and attempt to guess what the passcode entered
is. These users can then steal the smartphone and can thus have complete access
to all the victim’s files and pictures. Further, there are lots of cameras like CCTV
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in a building or on the streets. These cameras are always recording and can record
users’ entering their passcode on their smartphone. For this reason, we focus on video
recording to enable us to launch an online shoulder-surfing attack to predict users’
smartphone passcode.
In order to perform the shoulder-surfing attack, we record videos from both the
left and right side of the victim, simulating an attacker standing next to the victim in
a public environment such as a bus. Our passcode prediction algorithm extracts the
four frames where the victim is entering her four-digit passcode, rebuilds the grid of
the keypad, and determines the location of the victim’s fingertip. We can thus predict
what number the victim is “typing”. We evaluate our algorithm with 20 videos. We
correctly predict 74 out of the 80 digits, a success rate of 92.5%. Our algorithm
can also be deployed online, taking less than 75 seconds to make a prediction for a
number.
Our main contribution is the design and implementation of an online algorithm to
accurately predict a smartphone’s four-digit passcode using a camera to record the
victim entering the passcode. Our algorithm requires minimal training. It can also
identify the smart device and rebuild the virtual keypad automatically regardless of
the size and type of the device.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We review related work in Section 2.2.
Section 2.3 shows the design of our passcode prediction algorithm. The experimental
results are shown in Section 2.4. Improvements are discussed in Section 2.5. Finally,
Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Related Work
Previous work has shown side channels attacks are possible in guessing key strokes.
Timing attacks on SSH [5], reflections off windows or computer monitors [6, 7], and
keyboard acoustics [8] can reveal the keystrokes of a user on a keyboard. If an ad-
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versary has control over the mobile device, she can use the device’s accelerometer [9],
motion [10], or camera and microphone [11] to infer the user’s keystrokes such as PIN
or password. EyePassword [12] utilizes the user’s gaze during password entry in an
attempt to prevent shoulder surfing.
Shoulder surfing is a well-known problem [13–15]. Hoyle et al. found that
life-logging cameras, such as Google glass, automatically recorded information that
users preferred to keep private, including computer screens and bank card informa-
tion. [16]. De Luca et al. created an authentication mechanism designed to protect
against against shoulder surfing called XSide, which uses the front and back of smart-
phones [17]. This is a new authentication scheme and is not widely used. The most
common form of authentication for mobile devices is PIN passcode. Roth et al. de-
signed a PIN entry method to resist shoulder surfing [18]. Their scheme forces the
user to perform some cognitive functions before entering their PIN; this makes the
numbers entered for each authentication different each time assuming the attacker
does not know the cognitive work to be performed.
Schiff et al. created a program to automatically recognize people based on visual
markers [19]. Other research has looked at shoulder surfing vulnerabilities on a variety
of a different types of password entry screens, including keyboards [20], graphical
passwords [21, 22], and Android unlock screens [23, 24]. In their study of Android
unlock screens, [23] created video recording software to guess Android passwords
by tracking fingertip motions. In contrast, we look at PIN passcodes, which is a
harder task because the numbers touched by a user have to be retrieved rather than
a continuous pattern. Shukla et al. designed an attack to guess a user’s PIN based on
the movement of their hands as seen from behind a smartphone [25]. We attempt to
retrieve their PIN from a different visual angle, namely behind the user. Moreover,
we analyzed the smartphone screen together with the finger location instead of the
hands’ movement; we also achieved a higher accuracy.
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Yue et al. [26] proposed an approach to detect the types of device used and based
on the keypad arrangement of the device, predicts the PIN entered by analysing the
user’s hand. Compared to [26] which requires new training for new types of devices
and new reference images of the software keyboard of the devices, our algorithm
requires minimal training. Our algorithm can also identify the smart device and
rebuild the virtual keypad automatically regardless of the size and type of the device.
2.3 Passcode Prediction
Figure 2.1: Overview of our attack to detect PIN entered on an observed smartphone.
(a) Our attack starts with recording a video of a victim who is entering the passcode.
The video consists of multiple frames. (b) TLD is applied to identify the frames where
the victim is typing (clicking) on the screen. For a four-digit PIN, this will identify
four frames. (c) A classifier is used to identify the Region of Interest (ROI) in each
frame. (d) The Line Segments Detector outlines the edges (lines) of the smartphone.
(e) Rebuild the numbers of the keypad on the screen from the user’s point of view.
(f) Apply the skin detector algorithm to filter out the fingers inside the screen and
then predict the number the user touched on.
This section provides an overview of our passcode prediction scenario. An ad-
versary is able to observe a victim entering her passcode on her smartphone. The
observation could happen due to the ubiquity of people using smartphones and the
emergence of head-mounted devices such as Google Glass, Microsoft Hololens, and
Snapchat Spectacles. These devices can record videos without the knowledge of other
people nearby. Moreover, users typically use their smartphones in public. If they use
a passcode, such as a four-digit PIN passcode, then they have to enter that passcode
each time they want to use their smartphone. An adversary thus can observe a vic-
tim entering her passcode multiple times and can record that observation without the
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knowledge of the victim. Figure 2.1 outlines an overview of the processes involved
in our passcode prediction. Our proposed attack consists of five steps: recording the
videos, extracting the frames where the user is entering the PIN, identifying the re-
gion of interest (ROI) within each frame, detecting the contour of the smartphone in
the region of interest, rebuilding the keypad, and making the prediction. Each step
is described in more detail in the following subsections.
2.3.1 Video Recording
The first step, to perform passcode prediction, is to record a video of the victim
entering her PIN. The video can be recorded from different positions from the point
of view of the adversary. The different points of views are from the right side and
the left side of the victim. Recording videos could be done stealthily as people use
their smartphones all the time and could be recording at all times. Moreover, head-
mounted devices will become more common in the future. A common scenario where
this type of recording could take place is waiting at bus stations, when riding public
transportation, or while waiting to check out in a line. Moreover, surveillance cameras
such as CCTV can be recording the victim entering her passcode. The adversary has
to record the victim entering the whole passcode but usually that still results in short
videos of a few seconds. We note that most passcodes are four-digit numbers.
2.3.2 Extract Frames
Most smartphones can record videos at 30 frames per second. In a five-second video,
there are 30 × 5 = 150 frames. Out of these 150 frames, four frames have to be
extracted; these frames are the point when the user is touching one of the four numbers
in the passcode. Some videos can be recorded at 60 frames per second. Similar
to [23], we assume the following: 1) before and after unlocking, users often pause
for a few seconds and 2) four consecutive on-screen number-touching operations with
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short intervals because most people are used to unlocking their phones and are not
expected to take long or make mistakes. Based on these assumptions, we process the
video to reduce the number of frames that need to be analyzed by extracting only
the unlocking process. Then, with the implementation of the Tracking-Learning-
Detection (TLD) algorithm [27] in OpenCV [28], we can obtain the frames where the
victim is entering her passcode by tracking the moving path of the fingertip. Based
on the gradient (that is, analyzing a video in terms of frames) of frames in a video, a
user typically stays on the same number for several frames; this is the time to touch
the screen. By applying the second assumption to the result of the TLD algorithm,
we can extract the relevant frames. In our case, it is 4 frames (four-digit passcode,
one frame for each). TLD gives a tracking map of the fingertip movement over time;
the frames we want are the ones with more dots or dark areas. Since a passcode is
typically four numbers, the goal of this step is to extract the four frames associated
with the victim entering the four numbers. This step uses the TLD algorithm to
detect the typing moment and extract the frame. However, through experimental
process, we noticed that sometimes the frame extracted by the TLD algorithm is not
clear or the victim’s finger is not exactly on the number. We thus also analyze the
frame before and after. Figure 2.1(b) shows an extracted frame from a recorded video
where the victim is entering the passcode.
2.3.3 Identify Region of Interest
Once the four frames are extracted (in this case, it would be 12 frames since we
consider the frame before and after the extracted frame), the region of interest (ROI)
needs to be identified. In our case, the ROI is the smartphone so that the numbers
being pressed can be detected. We use the Cascade Classifier Training [29] provided
by OpenCV on our dataset. More specifically, object detection using the Haar feature-
based cascade classifier [30] is an effective object detection method proposed by Paul
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Viola and Michael Jones. It is a machine learning based approach where a cascade
function is trained from many positive images and negative images. Positive images
are images that contain the target object in the image while negative images are
images that do not contain the target object in the image. The target object, in our
case, is the smartphone. The classifier is then used to detect objects in our frames
(each frame is an image). Figure 2.1(c) shows the identified ROI from the extracted
frame.
2.3.4 Detect Contour
After the ROI is identified, the outline of the smartphone is then detected. This
step is important for the following step of rebuilding the keypad on the smartphone.
The position of the keypad depends on where the smartphone screen is. From Fig-
ure 2.1(c), the image must first be smoothed as shown in Figure 2.2(a). To achieve
smoothing, there are two morphological operations we can use. These are dilation
which adds pixels to the boundaries of the object in an image and erosion which does
the opposite. After applying smoothing, we get a new image which allows the long
edges of the smartphone screen to be extracted. The next step is to apply the Line
Segments Detector(LSD) [31]. LSD is an algorithm that can help us to extract the
edges of a smartphone from the ROI image. Figure 2.2(b) shows the edges of the
smartphone highlighted. It will produce a set of lines in the image. We then apply
the rules like line length and continuity to filter the noisy lines out. These rules are
defined as following: 1) Line length should be no shorter than 30% of the height in
the dimension of the ROI image; 2) Area of contour (continuous lines) should be no
smaller than 10% of the whole ROI image. We tested different percentages and found
that these give the best results for our experiments. Figure 2.2(b) shows the image
after applying the rules.
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(a) Smoothed ROI (b) Extracted Edges
Figure 2.2: Detecting the contour of the smartphone by extracting the edges from
the ROI image and filtering out noise.
2.3.5 Rebuild Keypad and Retrieve Finger Contour
The last step before performing the passcode prediction is to rebuild the keypad on
the smartphone. Based on the edges and the screen ratio which is 16 : 9 in this frame,
the distance of the numbers of the keypad from the edges can be calculated. We use
the Hue-Saturation-Value (HSV) values of the color of the person’s skin which we
want to filter out to remove the finger in the ROI. As shown in Figure 2.3, the skin of
the person is highlighted and it can be removed so that only the smartphone screen
is obtained. HSV color space is commonly used in computer vision due to its good
performance when comparing RGB color space in varying illumination levels. Often
thresholding and masking is done in HSV color space. So we apply the HSV values
of a person’s skin to get the outline of the person’s finger. After this, we can cut the
contour of the finger inside the phone screen out to predict the number being touched
on the smartphone screen.
We combine the result of the previous two steps to project the contour of the finger
to the key number grid to make a prediction of the current digit of the passcode. This
is shown in Figure 2.4, which is the final resulting image of our passcode prediction
algorithm. Our algorithm (see Section 2.3.6 for details) will do several passes to check
the contour points beyond each line formed by 123, 456, 789, 0, 147, 2580, 369; this
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Figure 2.3: Image of the ROI showing the person’s hand. The person’s skin color is
filtered out to obtain the contour of the finger.
Figure 2.4: Final image where the contour of the smartphone screen, the contour of
the finger, and the number keypad can be clearly seen.
is illustrated in Figure 2.5. For each pass, the probability of the number will be
increased inversely proportional to their distances to the center of the contour.
Figure 2.5: Pass line by line to locate the finger position.
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2.3.6 Prediction Algorithm
We now describe in more detail the algorithm used to predict the passcode. In
Section 2.3.5, we rebuilt the keypad on the smartphone screen and were able to
outline the finger contour of the victim. Essentially, the prediction algorithm is about
identifying the location of the fingertip of the victim’s finger on the keypad. If the
finger is not on an exact number, then the number closest is chosen. To determine
the position of the fingertip, we calculate the number of points (pixels) of the finger
contour “line by line.” Each line is the set of horizontal or vertical lines formed by
the keypad. For example, the four horizontal lines are formed by the set of numbers
123, 456, 789, and 0, and the three vertical lines are formed by the set of numbers
147, 2580, and 369 (see Figure 2.5). Algorithm 1 shows the process of first removing
the points/pixels of the finger contour that are not inside the phone screen.
Algorithm 1 Eliminate points of the finger contour outside phone screen
1: Function get inside points(FingerContour, ScreenEdges)
2: inside points← [ ]
3: for each point point in FingerContour do
4: if point is in ScreenEdges then
5: inside points.add( p)
6: end if
7: end for
8: Return inside points
9: EndFunction
The next step is to calculate the percentage of points “beyond” each of the hori-
zontal lines. “beyond” means the points that are under the line, that is, the line that
the points are associated with. For horizontal lines, this means, the points above the
numbers while for vertical lines, this means points to the left of the numbers. This
process cuts the finger contour into pieces by the lines 123, 456, 147, and so on and
then counts the points beyond or left of each line to get the location of the finger
contour. This is illustrated in Figure 2.6. For example, the percentage of points
beyond the horizontal line 123, P (123), is calculated as
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P (123) =
# of points beyond 123
total # of finger contour points
(2.1)
Based on the calculated percentages, we can tell if the fingertip contour is rightside
up or down. The percentages are also used as the weight to calculate the probability
for each number on the keypad. This is calculated as the average distance of each
point to each of the ten numbers on the keypad.Each number is represented by a
center point of a number round which is shown in keypad. So that, we can calculate
the distance to the number as the distance to the center point of it. This average
distance of all the points to the number 1 is calculated as
avg dist(1) =
∑n
i=1
√
(pointi.x− 1.x)2 + (pointi.y − 1.y)2
number of points beyond line 123
(2.2)
where pointi.x is the point i’s x-position and 1.x is the number 1
′s x-position. Based
on all the percentages, we can calculate which number is closer to the points of the
finger contour. Algorithm 2 shows this process for all the numbers of the keypad.
For example, P (123) gives the percentage of all three numbers 1, 2, and 3 of being
selected and P (147) gives the percentage of all three numbers 1, 4, and 7 of being
selected. In this case, the number 1 appears twice and the probability of the number
1 being the correct number selected by the user can be calculated. The calculation
for the number 1 is as follows
15
P (1) =
(
1− avg dist(1)
avg dist(1) + avg dist(2) + avg dist(3)
)
∗
P (123)
+(
1− avg dist(1)
avg dist(1) + avg dist(4) + avg dist(7)
)
∗
P (147)
(2.3)
Algorithm 2 Make prediction by calculating probability of each number
1: Function{make prediction}{FingerContour, PhoneNumber1to9}
. Horizontal lines
2: points beyond line123← FingerContour.points beyond(line123)
3: points beyond line456← FingerContour.points beyond(line456)
4: points beyond line789← FingerContour.points beyond(line789)
5: points beyond line0← FingerContour.points beyond(line0)
. Vertical lines
6: points beyond line147← FingerContour.points beyond(line147)
7: ... . Calculate percentage of points beyond each line
8: P (123)← # points beyond line123 / total # points
9: P (456)← # points beyond line456 / total # points
10: ...
. Calculate average distance of each point to each line
11: avg dist1 ← avgdist(points beyond line123, point num1))
12: avg dist2 ← avgdist(points beyond line123, point num2))
13: ...
. Calculate probability of each number
14: P (1) = (1 − avg dist(1)
avg dist(1)+avg dist(2)+avg dist(3)
) ∗ P (123) + (1 −
avg dist(1)
avg dist(1)+avg dist(4)+avg dist(7)
) ∗ P (147)
15: ...
16: 3 numbers with highest probabilities← max 3{P (0), P (1), ..., P (9)}
17: Return 3 numbers with highest probabilities
18: EndFunction
2.4 Results
We now go over the results of our passcode prediction.
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Figure 2.6: Illustration of our prediction algorithm.
2.4.1 Data Collection
We recorded 20 videos with ten videos from both angles: from the left side of the
“victim” and from the right side of the “victim” with a distance about 1.5 meters
(4.9 feet). This distance is common in daily life situation like at a bus station. In our
experiment, the victim’s smartphone was a white iPhone 6s. An OnePlus 3T Android
phone with resolution 1080× 1920 and frame rate of 30 frames per second was used
to record the videos. Figure 2.7 shows the duration and total number of frames of
each video. The average duration of a video is 3.53 seconds and the average frame
count of a video is 105.75.
2.4.2 Automated Passcode Prediction
Based on our passcode prediction design from Section 2.3, we now present the results
of our algorithm on the recorded videos. Table 2.2 shows the prediction for the
passcode (2459) of the video .Each column shows the predicted number from our
algorithm along with the confidence percentage associated with that number. It can
be seen from the table that the predicted numbers are physically close to each other
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Figure 2.7: Video Frames Count and Duration Distribution.
on the number keypad. In this particular case, the first prediction was correct. We
note that making three predictions is still practical since the algorithm provides a
confidence percentage for each predicted number.
Table 2.1 shows the number of correct number predictions. Recall that we recorded
ten videos from the left point of view of the victim and ten videos from the right point
of view of the victim, and that each passcode is a four-digit PIN. Thus, there are a
total of 80 numbers to be predicted. The table shows the breakdown from each point
of view. When allowing our algorithm to only make one prediction, that is, predicting
the most likely number, then it is able to correctly predict 26 out of the 40 numbers
from the right side and 16 out of 40 numbers from the left side. Although the success
rate is not high, if we increase the number of predictions to the top two most likely
numbers, then the algorithm is able to predict 34 out of 40 numbers from the right
side and 29 out of 40 numbers from the left side. When we increase the number of
prediction to 3, then our passcode prediction algorithm is able to correctly predict
92.5% of the numbers, or 37 out of the 40 numbers from either side.
The success rate of our algorithm in correctly predicting each of the ten possible
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numbers as shown in Table 2.3. It can be seen that most of the numbers on the
edges of the keypad can be perfectly predicted while the numbers in the “middle” are
harder to predict, like 4, 5, 7, and 9.
Table 2.1: Number of correct predictions of the passcode detection algorithm on
recorded videos from the left and right side of the victim.
Right Side Left Side
Total # of numbers 40 40
# of correct first predictions 26/40 16/40
# of correct second predictions 8/40 13/40
# of correct third predictions 3/40 8/40
# of correct predictions 37/40 37/40
Table 2.2: Example of one passcode 2459 and the predictions along with the confi-
dence of our algorithm.
User PIN First Prediction (confidence) Second Prediction (confidence) Third Prediction (confidence)
2 2 (38.5%) 3 (37.5%) 5 (23.9%)
4 4 (44.3%) 1 (29.5%) 5 (26.2%)
5 5 (45.0%) 8 (32.0%) 2 (23.1%)
9 0 (37.0%) 9 (33.0%) 6 (30.0%)
Table 2.3: Success rate for each number from both sides.
Number Success Rate
0 100.00%
1 100.00%
2 100.00%
3 100.00%
4 77.78%
5 92.86%
6 100.00%
7 80.00%
8 100.00%
9 71.43%
2.4.3 Analysis of Failed Predictions
Most of the failed guesses in predicting the passcode in our experiments are caused
by distorted images we obtained from the two aspects of image processing of our
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algorithm. The first aspect is identifying the Region of Interest (see Section 2.3.3).
The second aspect is to correctly rebuild the edges of the phone screen. We will
discuss these two aspects in more detail in the following section.
2.4.4 Algorithm Processing time
The training for the cascade classifier to identify the Region of Interest takes about
7 days to reach a positive rate of 95%. However, this training only needs to be done
once. Our prediction algorithm, using the OpenCV software, performs the prediction
process of one passcode (four numbers) in less than 30 seconds. The TLD algorithm
takes less than 5 minutes to analyze and output the target frames. Overall, the
prediction process takes about 5 minutes for the whole 4-digit passcode. Predicting
one number will thus take about 75 seconds which can be considered to be real-time.
2.5 Improvements and Discussions
We discuss improvements that can be made to the passcode prediction algorithm,
along with discussion of future work.
Four out of the six failed predictions were due to the failure of the algorithm to
detect the Region of Interest in the video frame. Since identifying the Region of
Interest depends largely on the Haar feature-based cascade classifier, more positive
and negative images with training at a higher positive rate will likely resolve this
issue. However, this will increase the training time for the classifier, but we note
that the training only needs to be performed once. The other failed predictions were
incorrect predictions. Upon examining the frames manually, it is hard to tell which
number the user was touching.
A possible improvement to our prediction algorithm is to use machine learning to
do the prediction. The training data will consist of images of users touching each of
the ten numbers from several angles. The first part of our algorithm still needs to be
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performed to identify the four frames. Afterwards, the machine learning algorithm
can take over to predict based on the image.
We used only one smartphone as the victim’s device. We plan on using different
types of smartphones in the future; we don’t expect this will affect our algorithm as
the screen edges can be identified regardless of the phone size and the number keypad
is built based on where the edges are. More videos taken at different angles such
as from the top and front of the victim can be recorded to generalize the algorithm
further. More videos will highlight the accuracy of the prediction algorithm. Different
angles will increase the complexity of the prediction; for example, for the top view, it is
hard to detect the movement of the fingertip while for the front view, the smartphone
blocks the fingertip.
Since we have shown that an online passcode prediction attack on smartphones
is possible and relatively fast (less than 75 seconds), the next step is to determine
mitigation mechanisms. One possibility is to use the other hand to hide the passcode
authentication process, similar to how ATM keypads are hidden while entering the
ATM PIN. Another possibility is for the user to move her finger randomly so as to
fool the algorithm in identifying the four frames. Randomizing the keypad number
is another possibility. The user could also hold her phone in one hand and use mul-
tiple fingers of the other hand to enter the passcode. All these mitigation techniques
decrease the convenience for the user which may lead the user to not have a pass-
code. We leave analysis of these mitigations as future works . We note that these
mechanisms provide a trade-off between security and convenience.
Our passcode prediction algorithm can also be extended to recognize passwords
entered instead of just PINs. The algorithm will have to be extended to rebuild the
keyboard rather than the number keypad and will also have to account for different
types of keyboards. We also emphasize that no special hardware is needed – we are
using a commodity smartphone to record the videos. A better quality camera will
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likely improve the accuracy of our algorithm.
2.6 Summary
In this paper, we design and develop an attack to accurately predict the passcode
entered by a victim on her smartphone. The attack relies on recording a video of
the victim using a common smartphone in a public environment. Our algorithm
achieves an overall accuracy of 92.5%. This result demonstrates that online shoulder-
surfing attacks on PIN-based authentication are possible. Also, these results show
that choosing a good random PIN cannot prevent this type of online attack as the
algorithm can still predict the PIN entered.
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CHAPTER III
Measuring Tor Relay Popularity
3.1 Introduction
Tor is one of the popular anonymous communication systems that can protect users
from leaking private information, such as the IP address, when users are browsing
the Internet and communicating with other users. Tor also allows users to circum-
vent censorship effectively to reach blocked websites or documents. Some compa-
nies (such as Facebook [32]) are even using Tor hidden services when they publish
their services or websites. Tor has more than 6, 000 volunteer-operated relay nodes
(servers/routers) [33]. Instead of connecting users directly to web servers or each
other, a Tor client makes the connections go through three of the 6, 000 relay nodes,
then to the destination. The Tor relay selection algorithm makes sure that no two
relays with the same /16 IP address are chosen. The three randomly selected relay
nodes form a Tor circuit. A circuit is re-used to transfer several TCP streams with a
maximum lifetime of 10 minutes [34].
As Tor becomes more popular, it becomes subject to a number of attacks and
respective countermeasures. The packet counting [35], end-to-end timing attack [36],
active and passive end-to-end confirmation attacks [36–38] are shown to be possible
in the Tor network. Tor aims to protect users against traffic analysis. If an adversary
has control or can eavesdrop over both entry and exit relay nodes, then a statistical
correlation attack can be performed by using the packets’ timing or packets’ size
information. Entry guards, which Tor client selects from a few relays at random as
the entry points, help against this kind of correlation attacks. Hence, our focus is on
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the middle and exit relays.
In this paper, we explore if there are some relay nodes which have a higher chance
to be selected in a circuit than other relays. Namely, these relays are more popular.
We also look into the /8, /16, /24 subnets and Autonomous System (AS) number
of all relay nodes to find out the popular subnets. We then look at the relationship
between the bandwidth of relay nodes and the popularity of relay nodes.
Our contributions are listed as follows:
• Popular middle and exit relays: Based on our dataset, we find there are
some middle and exit relays which are more popular than other relays. Some
Tor relays are 3 times more likely to be chosen than others, in building Tor
circuits. If Tor relays are randomly chosen, then some Tor relays have over 10
times higher chance of being selected.
• Popular /8, /16, /24 subnets: We analyze all relay nodes based on their /8,
/16, /24 subnets. Several subnets stand out as more popular than others. We
also see that correlation attacks are still possible on a small fraction of circuits
where an adversary controlling a /16 subnet could monitor network traffic of
both the client and the target website.
• Popular ASes: Some ASes are more popular than others, based on the number
of Tor relays belonging to those ASes. However, our results show that some of
these ASes have a much higher percentage of being selected, regardless of how
many Tor relays are in these ASes.
• Correlation attacks are still possible: We find that about 11% of circuits
built can be correlated, that is, both the client and server identified.
24
3.2 Background
Tor [34] is a popular low-latency anonymity network built over TLS connections and
based on onion routing. Tor is used by over 2 million unique users [33]. The Tor
system is run mostly by volunteer relays, with over 6, 000 relays [33]. Each relay
reports its IP address, public key, bandwidth, and contact information for the owner
to the centralized directory servers. When a Tor user (client) wants to use the Tor
network to connect to a server, it first contacts the directory servers to obtain a
consensus document of all the Tor relays. It then selects three Tor relays based on a
relay selection algorithm, see Figure 3.1. Tor relays are also referred to as nodes or
Tor routers. They are responsible for receiving and forwarding Tor traffic. The three
Tor relays chosen by the client are contacted telescopically. The client establishes
a secure connection with the first relay. Then going through the first relay, the
client establishes a secure (and anonymous) connection with the second relay. Going
through the first and the second relays, the client finally establishes a connection
with the third relay. This process builds a circuit for the client to use to connect to
a server.
Tor traffic is sent in fixed-size cells where each cell is 512 bytes [39]. When the
user makes the request, the user/client builds a circuit consisting of three relays
(entry guard, middle node, and exit node) before connecting to the destination server.
The constructed circuit can be shared by many TCP streams. Tor clients construct
circuits preemptively and substitute previously used ones with newly built circuits.
Each circuit lifetime is 10 minutes. Figure 3.1 shows the data flow in the Tor network
where the request of a client will pass through three Tor relays before reaching the
web server. In the circuit, the entry guard knows that the client is communicating
with the middle relay, but not who the exit relay or the destination server are. The
middle relay knows the entry guard is communicating with the exit relay but not who
the client or the destination server are. Similarly, the exit relay knows the middle
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relay is communicating with the server, but not who the client is. The server only
knows that the exit relay is acting as the client, but does not know who the real client
is.
Early onion routing systems initially specified that clients should select relays
uniformly [40] at random. With the increasing number of Tor users and relays, it
became necessary to improve relay selection strategy to balance traffic load with the
available Tor relay bandwidth. The choice of relays is determined by a weighting
function that includes the bandwidth, status flags of the relays and multiple other
considerations [41]. To be chosen, a relay has to have the following flags: stable, run-
ning, and valid. A Tor relay is considered to be “Running” if it has been successfully
contacted within the last 45 minutes [41]. Tor does not take the locations of relays
relative to the clients into consideration [42]. It will reuse the same circuit for new
data streams for 10 minutes. An exit relay has extra considerations since it has to
have an open outgoing port to the server (e.g. port 80 for web servers); many Tor
relays do not allow outgoing traffic outside of the Tor network.
Figure 3.1: How Tor works. 3 nodes are selected from running Tor relays
To reduce the probability of disclosing the client information to attackers, Tor
users randomly select a few relays to use as entry guards, and use only those relays
for their first hop. The entry guard knows the identity of the client and the middle
node for each circuit. The same entry guard is kept for 2 months. The relay can
be considered as an entry guard only if it is fast, stable and has higher bandwidth
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than a specific threshold. More details of selecting entry guards can be found in [41].
The entry guard, middle relay, and exit relay are chosen from different /16 subnet IP
addresses.
3.3 Experiment Setup
This section provides an overview of the design of our experiments and how we collect
and analyze data.
3.3.1 Data Collection
We deployed our experiments on 44 different machines from different locations. The
machines are from Google cloud instances and the PlanetLab network [43]. PlanetLab
is a global research network that supports the development of new network services.
On each machine, we installed Tor and Stem [44] version 1.5.2, which is a Python
controller library for Tor.
We set up a script supported by Stem to automate visiting websites. We visited the
homepages of Alexa top 100 websites [45] sequentially through Tor for each of the 44
machines. During each visit to a website, we discard the TCP packets. Only metadata
information of Tor circuits are collected. This includes the following information.
1. Tor Relays. There are 3 Tor relays during a visit to a website: entry guard,
middle relay and exit relay. The IP address and port, fingerprint, nickname,
locale, and advertised bandwidth are collected. We also converted the IP ad-
dress to a geolocation (city and country) and to an AS number. The advertised
bandwidth is the volume of traffic, both incoming and outgoing, that a relay is
willing to sustain, as configured by the operator and as observed from recent
data transfers.
2. Source. The IP address and the port number of the Tor client. This will be one
of the 44 machines used.
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3. Target. The IP address and the port number of the target destination. This
will be one of the 100 top Alexa websites.
The experiments were run for 5 months, from November 2017 to March 2018.
Our dataset consists of 145, 918 entries. Each entry contains the information above:
source IP address, target IP address, the three Tor relays’ IP address, fingerprint,
nickname, locale, AS number, and bandwidth. The list of the top 100 Alexa websites
was downloaded on October 15, 2017.
We used our own clients to visit known websites. Other than the Tor relays
information such as IP address and bandwidth, which are already public information,
we do not collect any private data. Our automated experiments are also spaced
out such that the extra 44 clients would not affect the normal operation of the Tor
network.
3.3.2 Data Analysis
We next describe the type of analysis performed on our dataset. Since Tor sets the
entry guard to be the same for an extended period of time, we mainly focus our
analysis on the middle relay and exit relay. More specifically, our goal is to determine
if some relays are chosen more often than others meaning some Tor relays are more
popular. This could lead to privacy issues as an attacker can utilize that knowledge
to target the anonymity of users.
• “By Source”: we first analyze the dataset from the point of view of the 44 client
machines. We look mostly at the popularity of Tor relays, that is, how often
they are selected for circuits and how often they are in the top k relays for each
machine. We set k = 30 for our analysis. Next, we group the Tor relays by
subnets; we analyze /8, /16, and /24 subnets. If two Tor relays are in the same
/16 or /24 subnets, then they are likely in the same AS or controlled/observable
by the same entity.
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• “By Target”: we perform the same analysis, but this time considering the point
of view of the 100 target websites. The goal here is to determine whether
some Tor relays are more popular based on the website visited. This could
mean some websites are more targeted or could increase the likelihood of an
adversarial entity (such as an ISP) being able to determine the target website.
• Overall: we then perform a holistic view of our dataset to identify who the most
popular relays are.
3.4 Experimental Results
This section presents the results from our experiments and the analysis based on
the results for the middle and exit relays. For each approach as described in the
previous section (“by source”, “by target”, and overall), the analysis is based on the
IP address, /24 subnet IP address, /16 subnet IP address, /8 subnet IP address, and
AS number for the Tor relays. Due to space restrictions, we show the results for the
/16 subnet as a representative result. The results and conclusions drawn from the /8
and /24 subnets are similar. We also show the result by AS number.
3.4.1 Dataset Overview
Our 44 machines visited 145, 918 sites in total. On average, each machine visited
3, 316 websites. This means that each of the top 100 Alexa websites received 33 visits
on average from each machine. During each website visit, we collected the IP address
for the client, the entry guard, the middle relay, the exit relay, and the target website.
Figure 3.2 shows a graph from the Tor metrics website [33]. It contains the number of
running relays that have flags “Running” and “Stable” assigned by the Tor directory
authorities. Over the 5 months, from November 2017 to March 2018, there are about
4, 800 stable relays and about 6, 000 running relays. As can be seen from the figure,
new relays join the network and old relays leave the network due to churn. During
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Figure 3.2: This graph shows the number of running relays that have the flags “Run-
ning” and “Stable” assigned by the Tor directory authorities. The graph shows the
range from November 2017 to March 2018 which is the duration of our experiments.
our experiments, our machines connected to 8, 523 unique relays.
The number of unique IP addresses, /24, /16, and /8 subnet IP addresses of
the relays used during our experiments are listed in Table 3.1. 8, 523 unique relay
nodes are used in the experiments. These relay nodes are almost all the running
nodes during the time period of our experiments. Since there are around 6, 000 relay
nodes at any time, on average, each relay node will be used in 24 circuits or website
visits. Out of 145, 918 total circuits created, this comes up to 24/145918 = 0.02%.
Each of our 44 source machines connected to 2, 061 relay nodes (or 2, 055 unique
relays because some relays can be used as either middle or exit relay) on average (for
the 3, 316 circuits built). Breaking it down to different types of relays: on average,
this comes up to 3 entry guards, 1, 550 middle relays, and 508 exit relays for each
machine. Each middle relay would then be used, on average, 3316/1550 = 2.14 times
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in total. This means that out of the 3, 316 circuits, a Tor relay has a chance of
2.14/3316 = 0.065% chance of being selected as a middle relay. Each exit relay is
used, on average, 3316/508 = 6.52 times in total. This means that a Tor relay has
a 6.52/3316 = 0.20% chance of being selected as an exit relay. All the relays found
belonged to 1, 096 ASes, which means there were on average 466 relays per AS.
Table 3.1: # of Tor relays, in terms of unique IP addresses, /24 subnet, /16 subnet, /8
subnet and AS number used when collecting data in our experiments over 5 months.
# of relays Avg # relays Avg # entry guards Avg # middle relays Avg # exit relays
per machine per machine per machine per machine
IP addresses 8,523 2,054.93 3.02 1,550.39 508.47
/24 subnets 6,949 1,695.11 3.02 1,392.18 355.77
/16 subnets 2,885 851.91 2.95 725.82 237.16
/8 subnets 184 129.43 2.82 119.84 82.07
AS 1,096 466.52 2.73 384.18 157.91
3.4.2 Metrics Used
We use the following metrics to determine the popularity of Tor relays.
1. Relay percentage: this is the percentage of visits that include the relay node
in the circuit. In “by source”, this means the percentage out of 3, 316 visits for
each machine. In from all sources, it is the percentage out of all 145, 918 visits.
This will likely be a low number but the goal is to determine if some relays are
used more often in circuits than others.
2. Repeated percentage: this is the percentage of relay nodes that appear in
the top 30 most-used relays of one source machine and also appear in the top
30 most-used relays for the other 43 machines. For example, relay node A is in
the top 30 most-used nodes for machine S. This means that out of the 3, 316
circuits/visits for machine S, the relay A is in the list of 30 most-used relays for
these 3, 316 circuits. To continue the example, let’s say that A also appears in
the top 30 most-used relays for 32 other machines (out of 44 machines in total).
Then the repeated percentage for relay A is (32+1)/44, which is 75%.
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Figure 3.3: Point of view of all machines. The percentage of times a relay has been
used as a middle relay for all circuits. This shows the top 30 most-used relays.
3. Relay bandwidth: this is the advertised bandwidth from [33]. It is the volume
of traffic, both incoming and outgoing, that a relay is willing to sustain, as
configured by the operator, and observed from recent data transfers.
4. Relay popularity: if a relay is popular, the relay node will get more traf-
fic/visits/selections than other nodes. In our analysis, a factor for popularity
is the percentage of visits a node has. Previously, we showed the average relay
percentage is 0.02% (of total 145, 918 visits). In terms of one source machine,
each middle node gets a relay percentage of 0.065% (of 3316 visits) and each
exit node gets a relay percentage of 0.20% (of 3316 visits) on average.
3.4.3 Analysis of Middle Relays
We first analyze the popularity of relays chosen as middle relays in all the circuits
created by the 44 machines.
1) By source IP address: We first look at the popularity of middle relays
from the point of view of the source machines (clients). Figure 3.3, Figure 3.4,
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Figure 3.4: Point of view of all machines. The percentage of times a relay is selected
as the middle relay in a circuit and that relay’s corresponding bandwidth.
Figure 3.5: Point of view of all machines. The repeated percentage for each relay is
chosen as a middle relay. This shows the top 30 most-used relays.
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and Figure 3.5 are the analysis results when considering all our source machines
together, that is analyzing all circuits from all source machines together. Figure 3.3
shows the 30 most-used middle relays and the number of times as a percentage that
they have been selected as Tor middle relays for all circuits. From Figure 3.3, the
relay named DipulseIT1 with IP address 62.210.82.83 has the highest probability
of being selected, at around 0.63%. That is about 10 times higher than the average
0.065% we mentioned in Section 3.4.1. In Figure 3.4, we have the % of a middle
relay being selected as a middle relay in circuits to websites and the bandwidth
of that relay. There is no obvious relationship between the percentage of a relay
being selected and its bandwidth in the middle relay selection. Figure 3.5 shows
the percentage of the top 30 most-often-selected relays that are also in the top 30
most-often-selected relays when considering machine by machine separately. As an
example, let’s consider the relay named CryoBBNx with IP address 51.254.45.43, the
relay named TotorBE1 with IP address 5.39.33.176, and the relay named TotorBE2
with IP address 5.39.33.178. They all have a repeated percentage of about 70%.
That means, they are also in the top 30 most-used relays of 70% of all machines.
This further confirms their popularity. Over all the relays, we can see from the
figures that some relays have a much higher chance of being selected as a middle
relay in Tor circuits than others, regardless of their bandwidth. These relays are not
only popular for one client machine, but also for other client machines, regardless of
the source IP address.
2) By source /16 subnet: Instead of considering each middle relay by their
IP address, we now group the middle relays’ IP address in /16 subnets. Figure 3.6
shows the top 30 most-selected /16 subnet IP addresses for middle relays, along with
their percentage of being selected from all source machines. Figure 3.6 shows that
the relays in the subnet 51.15.*.* and 163.172.*.* have higher percentages being
selected during Tor circuit building. These two /16 subnets are in the top 30 most
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Figure 3.6: Point of view of all source machines. The percentage of selection of the
top 30 most-selected /16 subnet IP addresses for middle relays.
Figure 3.7: Percentage of # of middle relays in a /16 subnet.
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often selected middle relays of each source machine as well. The subnet 163.172.*.*
have the highest percentage near 2.5%. This shows that certain subnets are more
popular than others. This could mean that these subnets contain more Tor relays. It
could also mean that an adversary in these subnets will have a higher chance of being
selected as a middle relay than others. When analyzing /8 and /24 subnets, we see a
similar result.
It could be argued that subnets with more relays will obviously have a higher
chance of being selected. Figure 3.7 shows the number of middle relays under each
/16 prefix subnet (only the top 30 subnets are shown). In the figure, 163.172.*.*
has less than 2.0% middle relays in it when compared to the 2.5% chance of being
selected in circuits. However, 62.210.*.* has nearly 0.6% middle relays and it has a
2.1% chance of being selected. This indicates that the chance of a /16 subnet being
selected is not proportional to the number of relays it contains.
Figure 3.8: Point of view of one target destination IP address 151.101.128.81. The %
of selection of the 30 most often selected Tor relays as the middle relays in circuits.
3) By target IP address: Looking at all Tor relay routes from the perspective
of the target websites (the web servers), we perform a similar analysis as earlier.
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Figure 3.9: Point of view of one target destination IP address 151.101.128.81. The
percentage of selection of the top 30 most often selected Tor relays as the middle
relays in circuits and these relays’ corresponding bandwidth.
Figure 3.10: Point of view of target IP address 151.101.128.81. The % of the 30 most
often used relays being selected as middle relays, grouped by /16 subnets.
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Figure 3.8 shows the percentage of each relay being selected as the middle relay when
the target IP address is 151.101.128.81. The figure includes the top 30 most often
selected relays. The relay named DipulseIT2 with IP address 62.210.82.83 is the most
often selected relay with a percentage of 0.385%. Figure 3.9 shows the percentage of
being selected and the bandwidth of these top 30 middle relays. From the figure, there
is a slight trend of the relay node with more bandwidth having a higher percentage
of being selected as a middle relay. This is different from our analysis by source
machines.
4) By target /16 subnet: Here, we analyze middle relays based on their /16
subnet prefix and the target websites’ IP addresses. Figure 3.10 shows the top 30
subnets with their percentage of being selected. It is similar to previous analysis in
that we have relays in subnets 163.172.*.*, 62.210.*.*, and 5.9.*.* having a higher
chance of being selected than others. Subnet 163.172.*.* has the highest percentage
at 0.91%. This means that some subnets are more popular than others regardless of
the client IP address or the target IP address.
5) By AS: We further look into middle relays at the AS level. Figure 3.11 shows
the top 30 ASes that have the highest percentage of number of middle relays that are
in that AS. Figure 3.12 shows the top 30 ASes being selected in all circuits. AS16276
has the highest percentage of 16% being selected with only less than 8% of middle
relays in it. On the contrary, AS3320 contains nearly 7% middle relays with less than
0.9% chance being selected. Some ASes in Figure 3.11 are not even in Figure 3.12.
Hence, this shows that some ASes are more popular than others not because they
have more middle relays in them.
3.4.4 Analysis of Exit Relays
In this section, we analyze the popularity of relays chosen as exit relays in all the
circuits created by the 44 machines.
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Figure 3.11: Percentage of # of middle relays that is in an AS.
Figure 3.12: Percentage of an AS shown as Middle relay of all circuits.
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Figure 3.13: Point of view of all machines. The percentage of times a relay has been
used as an exit relay for all circuits. This shows the top 30 most-used relays.
Figure 3.14: Point of view of all machines. The percentage of times a relay is selected
as the exit relay in a circuit and that relay’s corresponding bandwidth.
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Figure 3.15: Point of view of all machines. The repeated percentage for each relay is
chosen as an exit relay. This shows the top 30 most-used relays.
Figure 3.16: Point of view of all source machines. The percentage of selection of the
top 30 most-selected /16 subnet IP addresses for exit relays.
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1) By source IP address: We first look at the popularity of exit relays
from the point of view of the source machines (clients). Figure 3.13, Figure 3.14,
and Figure 3.15 are the analysis results when considering all our source machines
together. From Figure 3.13, we can see the 30 most often used exit relays and the
percentage that they have been selected during all the visits. In the figure, the relay
named IPredator with IP address 197.231.221.211 has the highest percentage, 2.67%,
of being used as an exit relay among all the relays. That is about 14 times higher than
the average percentage 0.20% which we mentioned in Section 3.4.1. In the results of
top relays in the Tor circuits when considering only one single source machine, there
are relays being selected as exit relays more often than other relays. Also these source
machines share several exit relays in their own top 30 exit relays list among all Tor
circuits, as shown in Figure 3.15, such as novatorrelay with IP address 93.174.93.71
and hviv104 with IP address 192.42.116.16. These exit relay nodes appear in more
than 90% of the top 30 exit relays lists from all source machines. This means that,
over all the relays, some of the relays have a higher chance to be selected when Tor
builds a circuit. This further confirms their popularity. Figure 3.14 shows the % of a
relay selected as exit nodes during all the visits of one machine to websites and the
bandwidth of the relays. From the figure, it can be seen that a relay node with more
bandwidth has a better chance to be selected as an exit node during circuit building.
2) By source /16 subnet: Instead of analyzing each exit relay by their IP
address, we now group the exit relays’ IP address in /16 subnets. Figure 3.16 shows
the 30 most-often-used exit relays with same /16 subnet prefix and the percentage of
circuits which have that relay as an exit relay. The relay nodes with subnet 51.15.*.*
and 185.220.*.* stand out in the figure. 51.15.*.* has a percentage of 6.32% and
163.172.*.* has a percentage of 5.44%. 185.220.*.* is the most popular one with a
percentage of 9.13%. Also, 176.1.*.* and 163.172.*.* have the higher percentage.
Hence, with results from all these figures, there are several /16 subnet prefixes that
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Figure 3.17: Percentage of # of exit relays in a /16 subnet.
have a better chance to be chosen as exit nodes. When analyzing /8 and /24 subnets,
we see a similar result. In Figure 3.17, we show the percentage of number of exit
relays under a /16 subnet. For example, 51.15.*.* has 5.5% of all exit relays in
it. However, comparing Figure 3.17 with Figure 3.16, we can see that a /16 subnet
may not have a higher chance to be selected even though it has a high percentage
of number exit relays in it. From Figure 3.17, 199.249.*.* subnet contains 4.5% exit
relay. However it only has less than 1.5% chance to be selected.
3) By target IP address: We now analyze the popularity of relays from the
point of view of the target websites. Figure 3.18 lists the top 30 most often selected
exit relays’ names from all source machines to the website 151.101.130.167. The relay
IPredator with IP address 197.231.221.211 is the one with the largest percentage of
being selected at 1.02%. Figure 3.19 shows the percentages of a relay being used as
an exit node and its bandwidth during our experiments. IPredator has a bandwidth
of 175.13 MiB/s with the highest percentage of 1.02%. The relay named marylou1b
with IP address 89.234.157.254 has a bandwidth of 41.65 MiB/s with the second
highest percentage of 0.56%. From that figure, it can be seen that a relay with higher
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Figure 3.18: Point of view of one target destination IP address 151.101.130.167. The
% of selection of the 30 most often selected Tor relays as the exit relays in circuits.
Figure 3.19: Point of view of one target destination IP address 151.101.130.167. The
percentage of selection of the top 30 most often selected Tor relays as the exit relays
in circuits and these relays’ corresponding bandwidth.
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Figure 3.20: Point of view of target IP address 151.101.130.167. The percentage of the
top 30 most often used relays being selected as exit relays, grouped by /16 subnets.
bandwidth has a higher chance of being selected.
4) By target /16 subnet: Figure 3.20 shows the top 30 subnets with /16
prefix along with the percentage of being selected as an exit relay that is within the
subnet. From Figure 3.20, we see that 185.220.*.* has the highest percentage at
3.69%. 185.220.*.* is also in the list of top 30 exit relays from all source machines
in Figure 3.16. 51.15.*.* is also one of the subnets that appeared in both figures. It
has a percentage of 2.08% in Figure 3.20. This result again shows that some subnets
have a higher percentage of being selected than other subnets.
5) By AS: We analyze exit relays in AS level now. Figure 3.21 and Figure 3.22
show the top 30 AS that have the highest percentage of number of exit relays that is
in an AS and the top 30 AS being selected in all circuits respectively. In Figure 3.22,
we can see AS like AS12876, AS200052 are more popular than other AS. AS12876
has the highest percentage of more than 12% being selected even though only 8%
of exit relays are in that AS. Some ASes in Figure 3.21, such as AS63949, are not
even in Figure 3.22. This leads us to the conclusion that there are certain ASes that
are more popular than other ASes and this is not proportional to the number of exit
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Figure 3.21: Percentage of # of exit relays that is under an AS.
Figure 3.22: Percentage of exit relays in an AS amongst all circuits.
46
Table 3.2: Results of comparing Tor relay nodes’ IP address and target websites’ IP
address in the same circuit to determine if they are in the same subnet prefix or AS
number. The total number of circuits is 145, 918.
Entry vs Target Entry vs Middle Entry vs Exit Middle vs Target Middle vs Exit Exit vs Target
/24 subnet prefix 0 0 0 2 0 1
/16 subnet prefix 104 0 0 8 0 10
/8 subnet prefix 3,906 6,750 10,456 2,769 8,598 3,792
AS 150 24,439 16,866 287 11,308 36
relays in them.
3.4.5 Overall
We now provide a more holistic view of our dataset. We compare the Tor entry guard,
middle relay and exit relay in a circuit to see if they are in the same subnet prefix
(/24, /16, and /8) and same AS. We also compare the relays and the target website IP
address. This comparison is done for each circuit built. Table 3.2 shows the results of
our comparison: there is not much overlap at the /24 subnet, but at the /16 subnet,
104 pairs of entry guard IP address and target IP address are in the same /16 subnet.
This could lead to correlation attacks launched to determine who the user is. At a /8
subnet prefix and AS level, there are more pairs that match. This is expected, but
could be an issue if an adversary controls a large swath of IP address space. Looking
at the AS numbers, about 11% of all circuits could be compromised as these circuits
have the client or entry relay and the target or exit relay in the same AS. This is a
significant number and shows that ASes can correlate clients and targets. This does
not include Internet Exchange Points, and we expect this is worse when these are
considered.
3.5 Related Work
Tor was introduced and began operating in 2003 [39], providing service that enabled
users to access the Internet anonymously [37]. When communicating with others,
Tor clients choose a three-hop circuit from the set of available volunteer relays in the
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network. Tor allows researchers to the Tor network data such as relay bandwidth,
the number of active Tor relays, etc, through the Tor Metrics Portal [33]. Although
Tor provides anonymous service, Tor users are vulnerable to an adversary that can
observe some parts of the Tor relays [46]. Tor can also be blocked since all the Tor
relays are public information [47, 48]. We used 44 independent machines located in
different areas of the world to connect to popular websites through Tor.
Adversaries can exploit the nature of Internet routing by performing network
traffic analysis [36, 49, 50] to increase the chance of observing users’ communications
traffic. They gain the visibility of Tor traffic either by compromising Tor relays, or by
invading and manipulating underlying network communication like the Autonomous
Systems (ASes) [46,51–53]. If an attacker can observe the traffic from both the client
to the entry guard and the exit relay to the server, then the leaked information,
including the packet timing and sizes, is enough for attackers to infer the identities of
the clients and servers from timing analysis [54]. This is a correlation attack [46,55].
Our results show that some relays are much more popular than others. Moreover,
correlation attacks could be performed as some Tor entry guards and exit relays/target
websites are in the same /8 or /16 subnets.
Tor’s path selection algorithm uses the estimated bandwidth of the nodes as a cen-
tral feature. To mitigate the threat of AS-level adversaries, AS-aware path selection
algorithms were proposed that consider the bandwidth and IP address when choos-
ing relays while creating Tor circuits [56,57]. They attempted to infer AS path from
incomplete knowledge of the Internet topology and tried to avoid picking entry-exit
pairs routing through the same AS or that may be subject to correlation attacks. This
minimizes the amount of information gained by the adversary. Our work provided
the list of popular relays that will benefit selection algorithm design by comparing
theoretical analysis with our results.
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3.6 Conclusion
We provide a comprehensive analysis of the popularity of Tor relays. Our dataset
consists of Tor relay nodes, collected by visiting the Alexa top 100 websites through
the Tor network for 5 months, by using 44 different source machines. Our dataset
records the information of each Tor relay in circuits: the relay node IP address,
fingerprint, geolocation, and advertised bandwidth. Our dataset also contains the
IP address of the source machine used and the target website. Then we analyze the
dataset from many different perspectives: by source machine, by target IP address,
by IP address, by /8 subnet, by /16 subnet, by /24 subnet and by AS.
The results show that some Tor relays and some subnets (either /8, /16, or /24)
are more popular when being selected as middle relays or exit relays. From analysis
of middle relays, the Tor relay named TotorBE1 with IP address 5.39.33.176, is 3
times more likely to be chosen than other relays and 10 times more likely to be chosen
than an average relay. Our data also show that the bandwidth of a relay does not
affect its chance of being selected as a middle relay node when a Tor client builds a
circuit. When grouping Tor relays’ IP addresses into /16 subnets, some subnets, such
as 51.15.*.* and 163.172.*.*, are more popular than other subnets. Additionally, our
analysis indicates that the chance of a /16 subnet being selected is not proportional
to the number of relays it contains. For example, 62.210.*.* has nearly 0.6% middle
relays however it has a 2.1% chance of being selected in circuits. When it comes to
AS level, AS16276 stand out. It has less than 8% of middle relays in it while it has
a chance of 16% being selected.
From analysis of exit relays, the Tor relay named IPredator with IP address
197.231.221.211 and the Tor relay named dreamatorium with IP address 89.31.57.58
are 6 times more likely to be chosen as an exit relay, compared with other relays.
There also seems to be a correlation between a relay’s bandwidth and its popularity
as an exit relay. Similarly, in /8, /16, and /24 subnets, we found that some subnets
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like 185.220.*.* and 51.15.*.* are 6 times more likely to be selected as exit relays
than other subnets. From the results, we can see that a /16 subnet may have a higher
chance to be selected even though it has a lower percentage of number exit relays in
it. Like 185.220.*.*, it has 3.15% exit relays and it has a percentage of 9.13% of
being selected. At the AS level, we can see ASes like AS12876, AS200052 are more
popular than other AS. AS12876 has more than 12% chance of being selected even
though only 8% of exit relays are in the AS.
For future work, we plan to explore more aspects of Tor relays in terms of popular-
ity at the geolocation level. We will further explore the correlation between bandwidth
and popularity as a middle relay or exit relay. Based on this result, we will also find
ways to perform correlation attacks on Tor and learn how to make the relay selection
algorithm more balanced.
Acknowledgments: We thank Mr. Ippei Okamura for his help with collecting the
data, and Google for providing us Google Cloud credits to increase our number of
vantage points.
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CHAPTER IV
Anonymous Networks Website Fingerprinting
4.1 Introduction
Anonymous communication’s goal is to hide the relationship and communication con-
tents among different parties. Once two parties establish an anonymous communi-
cation between them, the contents are encrypted and routing information is hidden,
thus masking the source and destination IP addresses from third parties. Tor [58,59]
is one of the most popular low-latency anonymity-providing network. It is used by
millions of people daily [33]. Tor protects users’ privacy through a telescoping three-
hop circuit and encrypting the network traffic using onion routing. Although Tor
and many other privacy-enhancing technologies such as HTTPS proxy hide the com-
munication contents and network layer contents, the network traffic itself may leak
information such as packet size, inter-packet timing information, and direction of the
packets (from server to client or other way around).
A website fingerprinting (WF) attack is one where an attacker identifies a user’s
web browsing information by merely observing that user’s network traffic. The at-
tacker is not attempting to break the encryption algorithm or the anonymity protocol.
The only information available to the attacker is the metadata information such as
packet size, the timing information between packets, and the direction of the packet.
The success of this attack is measured by the number of websites correctly identified.
The accuracy has been shown to be around 90%, thus violating any privacy offered
by HTTPS and anonymity services like Tor.
It has been more than 15 years since the first website fingerprinting attack was
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proposed [60]. A number of studies on this topic have been released since then [61–63],
showing high accuracy in predicting websites in both the open and closed world
models.
All previous work rely on certain assumptions. The goal of this research is to
revisit some of these assumptions, namely: 1) the adversary can record the whole
network traffic trace for a website 1, 2) the victim visits one website at a time; here,
we focus on the situation the victim visits a second page before the first one finishes
loading (overlapping visits). When two website visits are overlapping or part of the
network trace is missing (either the beginning or the end), the website fingerprint-
ing accuracy falls dramatically. Hence, we propose a new algorithm “sectioning”
algorithm to deal with these overlapping traces and partial traces.
The contributions of this paper are summarized as follows.
• A “sectioning” algorithm to identify overlapping network traces. We
propose a new algorithm to section the trace into multiple sections and treat
each section independently to perform the website prediction. The hypothesis
is that if two traces overlap, the beginning of the first trace and the end of
the second trace would be unaffected. Sectioning then still allows for correct
identification of the two websites. When considering overlapping traces, the
accuracy of current techniques for website fingerprinting decreases to 20%−30%.
Our sectioning algorithm improves the accuracy to around 70%.
• Applying “sectioning” algorithm on partial traces. By applying “sec-
tioning” on partial traces, the accuracy (62.66%) is higher compared to previous
methods (20.76%) on predicting websites with the beginning parts of the trace
missing. When predicting websites with the last parts of the trace missing, the
accuracy is comparable. Hence, with sectioning algorithm, we can reduce the
impact of missing packets in a network trace.
1Note that we used trace, network trace, website, and webpage interchangeably
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This paper is structured as follows: in Section 4.2, we give the related background
and terminology of this paper. We propose a new “sectioning” algorithm to improve
the accuracy in overlapping traces in Section 4.3 and in partial traces in Section 4.4.
We conclude and provide avenues for future work in Section 4.5.
4.2 Background
• Definitions. We first define some terms we use throughout the paper.
– Trace. A trace is a time series of recorded network packets for a visit
to a webpage. Usually, tcpdump is used to record the network traffic. A
trace contains no background noise, only the network traffic to/from that
webpage.
– Overlapping Trace. When a trace consists of two pages, and the second
page starts before the first page ends, we call it an overlapping trace. It has
the same meaning as when the two pages are separated with negative-time.
– Partial Trace. A network traffic trace with part of it is missing (either the
beginning or the end).
• Threat Model. In website fingerprinting attacks, the adversary records net-
work traffic data of his own visits to a list of websites first through the Tor
network. Then the adversary can eavesdrop on the link between the victim
and the entry node. Figure 4.1 depicts where the adversary is. We assume the
attacker to be a passive observer which means it does not modify transmissions
and is not able to decrypt packets. An example of the adversary is Internet
Service Providers (ISP), and state-level agencies.
• WF Attack Procedures. Website fingerprinting has been shown to be a
serious threat against privacy mechanisms for anonymous web browsing. Re-
searchers have proposed different scenarios for website fingerprinting. The at-
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Figure 4.1: Threat Model.
tack and resulting experiment vary from each other; however, they all follow
similar steps. A website fingerprinting attack and analysis can be divided into
six steps: 1) collect data, 2) extract features from data, 3) select algorithm, 4)
build model based on 1) to 3), 5) evaluate real network traffic trace, and 6)
evaluate results. Figure 4.2 shows an illustration of all the steps of a website
fingerprinting attack. The last right-most block contains the measurements to
evaluate the effectiveness of an attack.
Figure 4.2: Steps of launching and evaluating a website fingerprinting attack.
When setting up an experiment for a website fingerprinting attack, the first step
is to perform data collection. A network traffic recording tool such as wireshark
or tcpdump is used. Before running any scripts to automatically collect data,
the configuration of the browser should be set to match the assumptions, such
as disabling all plug-ins to avoid background noise and clearing the browser
cache. The automated script will then visit websites in a certain order. The
time taken to collect data depends on the number of instances recorded for each
website and the size of the website list. Features extracted from the recorded
network traffic traces will be used for training. Each network trace is composed
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of a list of features. The features can be treated as attributes in a machine
learning context. A classification algorithm is applied to these features to build
the attack model. Different websites correspond to different classes. Different
network traffic traces are then collected to evaluate the performance of the
model. A 10-fold cross validation is often employed to reduce the bias in the
evaluation process.
In an open world model, a website being fingerprinted can be either from the list
or not in the list. The attacker keeps track of a small list of monitored websites.
Once a website fingerprint is obtained, the attacker attempts to determine if that
website is part of the list of monitored websites or not. More recent research
work [61, 63–72] deployed their website fingerprinting experiments under the
open world model and identified whether a website is from the list of monitored
sites.
• Dataset. Based on the foreground dataset of RND-WWW from [61], our ex-
periments in Section 4.3, and Section 4.4 randomly pick 100 website records
which contain 40 instances for each website from the original dataset. Each
instance is a trace containing the timestamped incoming and outgoing packets’
size in chronological sequence. Incoming packets are marked with a positive
sign, while outgoing packets are marked with a negative sign.
4.3 Analysis of Overlapping Traces
4.3.1 Motivation
This section provides an overview of the design of our experiments and a description of
our website fingerprinting attack when considering the situations of two overlapping
traces (webpages that are negative-time separated). This means that a victim visits
a second webpage while the first webpage is still loading. It’s not realistic to assume
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that a user visits only one webpage at a time. However, only one previous paper [63]
has looked at overlapping website visits. Figure 4.3 illustrates two overlapping traces.
Trace A belongs to website A and Trace B is from website B. The size of the overlap
can vary. We focus on predicting both website A and website B. In previous work,
the prediction accuracy of classifying websites based on features like packet sizes
and number of packets is high at around 90%. Figure 4.4 shows the accuracy of
the k-NN algorithm when predicting traces with overlapped packets. It can be seen
that the accuracy decreases significantly from 89.89% to 22.80% with 5% overlapped
packets and to 19.29% with 10% overlapped packets. Thus, overlapping traces have
a big impact on prediction accuracy. In fact, visiting a webpage at the same time as
another webpage can be used as a defense to mitigate website fingerprinting attacks
because it generates “noise”. We, thus, propose a new “sectioning” algorithm that
can still accurately perform website fingerprinting attack on overlapped website visits.
Figure 4.3: Two website traces A and B overlap.
4.3.2 Sectioning Algorithm
We now present the design of our proposed “sectioning” algorithm. Instead of treating
a traffic trace as a whole, we split the trace into a certain number of sections and
perform website prediction on each section. The intuition behind why sectioning will
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Figure 4.4: Prediction accuracy as more packets overlap in the two traces.
help improve accuracy is that the overlapped parts will only appear in some sections
of the trace and other sections will not be disturbed. We also hypothesize that most
sections of the trace will not be disturbed. This allows us to perform a majority
voting on all the sections to decide which website is being visited.
Figure 4.5 shows the key parts of our sectioning algorithm: partitioning and ma-
jority voting.
1) Partitioning an instance into n sections: Partitioning each instance into
sections is the most important part of our algorithm. Each trace, whether for training
set or testing set, will be partitioned into n sections. If n = 1 section, this means
there is one section and this is what previous work has looked at; this is the base
case. Each section will be evenly split by two methods: a) number of packets; b) time
duration of a trace.
1a) sectioning by number of packets: If a trace has 1, 000 packets and will
be partitioned into 10 sections, then each section will contain 100 packets.
1b) sectioning by time duration: If the duration of a trace is 10 seconds,
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Figure 4.5: Outline of sectioning algorithm.
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when partitioning it into 10 sections, then interval of each section will be 1 second.
The sections with overlapping traces will clearly have more packets, but the number
of sections stays the same with regards to the training set.
2) Perform majority voting: As Figure 4.5 shows, the last step of our al-
gorithm is to perform majority voting. The purpose of sectioning is to reduce the
interference in prediction caused by the overlapped packets, that is, any incorrect pre-
dictions made due to overlapped packets will be ignored if the majority of the trace
(or sections) is not affected (overlapped). We already have the predictions for each
section of each trace. To predict the website for a trace, majority voting is performed
on the n sections of that trace to determine the predicted website. If there is no clear
majority, any of the highest number of predictions is chosen. For example, like the
overlapped trace B in Figure 4.3, a trace of website B is partitioned into 5 sections.
Suppose first 2 out of these 5 sections contain overlapped packets from another trace
of website A. The prediction for the first section is website A while the prediction
for the second section is website B. Since the remaining 3 sections are unaffected,
the predictions are website B. In this case, website B received 4 predictions while
website A received 1 prediction. Using majority voting, this trace will be classified
as website B.
4.3.3 Experiment Setup
Figure 4.6 shows our sectioning algorithm. The steps are as follows: 1) split dataset
into training and testing sets (Figure 4.6(a)); 2) Insert certain amount of packets ran-
domly from another website into the trace of each instance of testing sets – this forms
the overlapped traces (Figure 4.6(a)); 3) Partition into n sections for both training
and testing sets accordingly (Figure 4.6(b)); 4) Apply machine learning classifier (for
example, k-NN) to each section ((Figure 4.6(c)); 5) A majority vote will be performed
for the predictions from the different sections (Figure 4.6(d)); 6) Repeat to do 10-fold
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Figure 4.6: Overview of the sectioning algorithm.
cross validation.
We detail each step next.
1) Dataset: As mentioned before, we randomly chose n = 100 websites and
k = 40 instances per website from the RND-WWW dataset and CUMUL features
from [61]. Our first step is to split instances of each website into training and testing
set under a 10-fold cross validation. 10% of instances are in testing set, the rest are
in the training set. This means that 36 of 40 instances will be treated as training
set data for each website. We repeat each experiment 10 times, each time choosing a
random 36 instances for training.
2) Overlapped traces simulation: An overlapping visit means visiting one
website while visiting another website, so that it is hard to tell which website the
packet trace belongs to. As Figure 4.3 shows, website B has an overlap at the be-
ginning with website A and website A has an overlap at the end with website B. We
attempt to predict both websites using the sectioning algorithm. Wang’s work [63]
showed that it’s possible to find the split point which is the end of website A and the
start of website B in overlapped traces. We will outline our improved algorithm in
Section 4.3.5. Figure 4.7 shows that for our simulation, we insert-merge packets to
the beginning of a website trace when predicting website B, and insert-merge pack-
ets to the end of a website trace when predicting website A. To simulate overlapped
traffic traces, we add packets from one traffic trace (instance) of another website A
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to the beginning of website B or vice versa. This is not a prepend method, but in-
stead a merging is performed. Each instance contains packets’ sizes along with the
time stamp for each packet. We take the last few packets of website A and reset the
timestamp of that first packet to be zero so that the last few packets of website A
are merged into the beginning of website B. We also simulated different overlapping
fractions from 5% to 20%; this means we obtained the last 5% of packets from website
A’s network trace and merged with the beginning of the trace for website B. Also, we
do the same procedure to the end of the trace for website A.
As an example of inserting A to the beginning of B, all packets are of the format
< time >:< packetsize >. Let’s say the last two packets of website A are 2045 : 1040
and 2100 : 500 and the first two packets of website B are 50 : 412 and 70 : 250.
Resetting the timestamp of the first packet from website A to zero, the packets are
then 0 : 1040 and 55 : 500. Merging both set of packets together produces a new
network trace with packets 0 : 1040, 50 : 412, 55 : 500, and 70 : 250.
Figure 4.7: Simulate overlapping: add packets to the beginning of trace.
3) Sectioning: We emphasize that the training sets are the original traces.
Only the testing datasets are “overlapped”. We cross-validated the training set to
obtain a reasonable model. Every trace, in both training and testing sets, will be
partitioned into n sections, where n = 1, 4, 5, 8, 10. Each section is then parsed using
the CUMUL features, similar to [61].
4) Run training/testing: After we have each trace split into n sections,
90% of instances with same section number will be used as the training set. We
test the trained classifier on the remaining 10% of instances with the same section
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number. For classifier algorithm, we use the k-nearest neighbor (k-NN) algorithm.
Since each section is trained and tested independently of other sections, the result
is n predictions for the n sections. The n predictions can be the same website or
different websites. Figure 4.5 shows this procedure; in the figure, n = 5 sections, thus
there are 5 prediction sets accordingly.
5) Perform majority voting: Finally, we perform a majority voting on pre-
dictions obtained from different sections, to get a final prediction of which website
the trace belongs to.
4.3.4 Results
a) Sectioning by number of packets: Figure 4.8 and Figure 4.9 show the
accuracy result in correctly predicting websites A and B, when using sectioning by
number of packets. The % of overlapping packets and the number of sections are also
varied in the figures. Figure 4.8 shows the prediction accuracy for website A. With
the base case (1 section), the accuracy is comparable with the no overlap case (89%).
Sectioning by number of packets has a slightly decrease from 87.61% to 77.13% when
the number of sections is 4 and 5% overlap. From Figure 4.9, it can be seen that even
with 5% overlapping packets, the prediction accuracy for website B with 1 section is
22.80%. When the number of sections increases to 4, the accuracy also increases to
64.95%. This indicates that sectioning helps in mitigating the impact of the overlap.
Increasing the number of sections further from 4 to 10 slightly increases the prediction
accuracy and peaks at 67.92% with 8 sections. As the % of overlap increases from 5%
to 20%, the accuracy decreases as expected. When there is 20% overlapping packets,
the accuracy for 1 section decreases further to 15.85%. As the number of sections
is increased to 4, the accuracy is 39.06%. With 10 sections, the accuracy is 48.47%.
This is expected as the overlapping part becomes bigger, it affects more sections,
which makes prediction of the whole website harder. As shown in [73] and later in
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Figure 4.8: Prediction accuracy of website A with varying number of sections and
overlap %, using a) sectioning by number of packets.
Section 4.4, the difference in prediction accuracy in predicting websites A and B is
because the beginning of a trace is more important than the end when predicting a
website.
b) Sectioning by time duration: Figure 4.10 and Figure 4.11 show the accuracy
result in correctly predicting websites A and B when using sectioning by time dura-
tion. Figure 4.10 shows that the accuracy decreases from 83.35% with 1 section to
75.70% with 5 sections with 5% overlap. However, as the % of overlap increases to
over 10%, the accuracy with 5 sections is higher than with 1 section. For example,
when the % of overlap is 20%, the accuracy for 1 section decreases to 57.67%, and
the accuracy for 10 sections is 71.44%. This shows that unlike sectioning by number
of packets, the sectioning algorithm improves the accuracy when predicting website
A. From Figure 4.11, it can be seen that with 5% overlapping packets, the prediction
accuracy with 1 section is 26.09%. When the number of sections increases to 4, the
accuracy also increases to 68.25%. This indicates that sectioning helps in mitigat-
ing the impact of the overlap. Increasing the number of sections further from 4 to
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Figure 4.9: Prediction accuracy of website B with varying number of sections and
overlap %, using b) sectioning by number of packets.
Figure 4.10: Prediction accuracy of website A with varying number of sections and
overlap %, using b) sectioning by time duration.
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Figure 4.11: Prediction accuracy of website B with varying number of sections and
overlap %, using b) sectioning by time duration.
10 slightly increases the prediction accuracy and peaks at 70.11% with 10 sections.
As the % of overlap increases from 5% to 20%, the accuracy decreases as expected.
When there are 20% overlapping packets, the accuracy for 1 section decreases fur-
ther to 17.47%. As the number of sections is increased to 4, the accuracy is 48.58%.
With 10 sections, the accuracy is 62.59%. This result shows that sectioning by time
duration is slightly better than sectioning by number of packets, but the shape of the
graphs is similar.
Sectioning by number of packets means the number of packets is the same for
each section while sectioning by time duration means the time interval is the same but
number of packets could be different for each section. The results show that sectioning
by time duration is better than sectioning by number of packets for predicting both
websites A and B (first and second websites).
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4.3.5 Predicting Overlapping Point
Previous work [63] showed that the accuracy to find the split point in overlapped
trace is 32%. In this section, we attempt to improve the prediction accuracy on the
start and end of where the two webpages overlap.
Our method works as follows. To determine if there is an overlap, we hypothesize
that the number of packets during an overlap will be higher than when there is no
overlap, since there will be the network traffic from two webpages instead of one.
We divided the time into bins, so that we have discrete bins. For each bin, we then
counted the number of packets. If the number of packets in a bin is higher than a
threshold, we consider this as an overlap part. In all our overlapped traces, we know
the ground truth, so we can calculate the accuracy of our prediction.
We vary the size of the bin from 1 millisecond to 10 seconds. Figure 4.12 shows
the prediction accuracy for the overlap and non-overlap part when the bin size was
500 milliseconds. The accuracy is around 60% when predicting either the overlap
or no-overlap part. Increasing the bin size shifts the graph to the right. We also
considered the size of all the packets in each bin as a predictor and we obtained a
similar result.
4.3.6 Summary
We proposed a “sectioning” algorithm that can achieve better accuracy (around 70%
when predicting either the first or second website) than previous methods (57% when
predicting first website and 26% when predicting second website) when there is some
overlap of two websites. We also showed that the exact point where the overlap
starts and stops can be reasonably predicted. The overlap part can thus be effectively
ignored and an effective website fingerprinting attack performed.
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Figure 4.12: Prediction accuracy of the overlapping parts and non-overlapping parts.
4.4 Analysis of Partial Traces
4.4.1 Motivation
This section shows the impact of the possibility of partial traces (only part of the
website traffic have been captured) on website fingerprinting attacks. This could
happen when a victim visits one website and close the browser before the download
is complete or the adversary was only able to record part of the trace (either the
beginning or the end).
We assume there is only one website in the traffic trace. However, the adversary is
only able to record a fraction n of the traffic trace. When n = 100%, then this is the
assumption taken from previous work that an attacker is able to capture entire traces
for all websites. We vary n from 80% to 100% of the traffic trace from either the
beginning or the end. The adversary can observe the first n% of a website’s traffic
trace before some interference occurs, or the last n% of a website’s traffic trace.
Figure 4.13 shows the result of our experiments. When the whole trace is recorded,
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the accuracy is at 89.9%. When 10% of the packets are missed at the end of the
trace, then the accuracy goes down to 64.1%. However, when 10% of the packets are
missed at the beginning of the trace, then the accuracy goes down to 15.05%. It can
be seen that capturing the first n% of a website’s trace is more important than the
last n%. This could be due to more outgoing requests from the client to the server
which makes fingerprinting easier and more identifiable. This result confirms that
of [73]. The figure also shows that as the percentage of the trace available decreases,
the accuracy decreases significantly.
Figure 4.13: Accuracy of website fingerprinting when observing different percentages
of network traffic traces.
4.4.2 Sectioning Algorithm on Partial Traces
Since we have shown that our sectioning algorithm can still provide a high prediction
accuracy for overlapped traces, we now apply the same algorithm to partial traces.
The hypothesis is the same: some sections will be missing, but this should not affect
the other sections. We used the sectioning algorithm by time duration as this has
68
been shown to provide a better prediction accuracy. We also used the same dataset
as before. The training datasets consist of the whole network traces. The testing
datasets consist of the remaining instances with missing packets either at the begin-
ning or at the end. For each testing dataset, we remove the first n% of packets either
from the beginning or from the end.
4.4.3 Results
Figure 4.14 and Figure 4.15 show the accuracy in correctly predicting websites based
on partial traces, when varying the % of missing packets and the number of sections.
The base case is with 1 section, which means no sectioning algorithm applied. From
Figure 4.14, it can be seen that with 5% missing packets from the beginning of a
trace, the prediction accuracy with 1 section is 20.76%. When the number of sections
increases to 4, the accuracy increases to 57.34%. This indicates that sectioning helps
in mitigating the impact of the missing packets. Increasing the number of sections
further from 4 to 10 slightly increases the prediction accuracy and peaks at 62.66%
with 8 sections. As the % of missing packets increases from 5% to 20%, the accuracy
decreases. This is expected since with more missing packets, it affects more sec-
tions, which makes prediction of the whole website harder. By using our sectioning
algorithm, the accuracy improves significantly from the base case.
Figure 4.15 shows the accuracy of correctly predicting websites based on partial
traces with packets missing from the end. When missing 5% and 10% packets from
the end of a trace, the prediction accuracy with 1 section is 79.02% and 58.80%
respectively. With 10 section, the accuracy is 64.78% and 53.92% respectively. It is
slightly lower than the base case. However, when the % of missing increases to 15%
and 20%, the accuracy with 10 sections is 42.35% and 30.61% compared to the base
case 35.92% and 19.49%.
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Figure 4.14: Prediction accuracy when varying the number of sections and the % of
missing packets from the beginning.
Figure 4.15: Prediction accuracy when varying the number of sections and the % of
missing packets from the end.
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4.4.4 Summary
We show that our “sectioning” algorithm can also be used for partial traces. It has a
better accuracy (62.66%) comparing to previous methods (20.76%) on predicting web-
sites with missing packets at the beginning. Our algorithm achieves similar accuracy
with packets missing at the end. In general, this shows that our proposed sectioning
algorithm provides a higher or similar prediction accuracy as current algorithms.
4.5 Summary
In this paper, our goal is to address the impracticalities of website fingerprinting
attacks and propose solutions to several limitations:
1. We propose a “sectioning” algorithm to improve the accuracy in website pre-
diction of two overlapping traces from 22.80% to 67.9% and partial traces from
20.76% to 62.66%.
For the future work, we will test our algorithm in the open world setting and
will consider the scenario when more than two pages are overlap. Moreover, we have
showed some promising results in predicting exactly where two webpages overlap;
we plan to investigate this further. We will also run more experiments with a more
diverse dataset.
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CHAPTER V
Conclusion and Future Work
In this dissertation, we analyze the privacy of online and offline systems by focusing on
Tor networks and smartphones. First of all, for privact analysis of the offline systems,
we design and develop an attack to accurately predict the passcode entered by a
victim on her smartphone. The attack relies on recording a video of the victim using
a common smartphone in a public environment. Our algorithm achieves an overall
accuracy of 92.5%. This result demonstrates that online shoulder-surfing attacks
on PIN-based authentication are possible. Also, these results show that choosing a
good random PIN cannot prevent this type of online attack as the algorithm can still
predict the PIN entered.
Then, we look at Tor systems and try to find its relay popularity. Our results show
that some Tor relays, subnets (either /8, /16, or /24) and ASes are more popular when
being selected as middle relays or exit relays. Our data also show that the bandwidth
of a relay does not affect its chance of being selected as a middle relay node when
a Tor client builds a circuit. However, there seems to be a correlation between a
relay’s bandwidth and its popularity as an exit relay. For future work, we plan to
explore more aspects of Tor relays in terms of popularity at the geolocation level. We
will further explore the correlation between bandwidth and popularity as a middle
relay or exit relay. Based on this result, we will also find ways to perform correlation
attacks on Tor and learn how to make the relay selection algorithm more balanced.
Finally, for website fingerprinting on anonymous networks like Tor, We propose
a “sectioning” algorithm to improve the accuracy in website prediction of two over-
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lapping traces from 22.80% to 67.9% and partial traces from 20.76% to 62.66%. As
the future work, we will test our algorithm in the open world setting and will con-
sider the scenario when more than two pages are overlap. Moreover, we have showed
some promising results in predicting exactly where two webpages overlap; we plan to
investigate this further.
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